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PINS JURISDICTION,
THE VAGUENESS DOCTRINE,
AND THE RULE OF LAWt
Al Katz* &
Lee E. Teitelbaum*"
Statutes governing Persons in Need of Supervision' (PINS) often include a
wide variety of conduct or circumstances from which courts may infer the
need for intervention in a child's career. The Ohio "Unruly Child" provision
illustrates the breadth that such legislation may attain:
As used in . . . the Revised Code, 'Unruly Child' includes any child:
(A) Who does not subject himself to the reasonable control of his
parents, teachers, guardian, or custodian, by reason of his being wayward or
disobedient;
(B) Who is an habitual truant from home or school;
(C) Who so deports himself as to injure or endanger the health or morals
of himself or others;
(D) Who attempts to enter the marriage relation in any state without the
consent of his parents, custodian, legal guardian, or other legal authority;
tThe article is an adaptation reprinted with permission from BEYOND CONTROL: STATUS
OFFENDERS IN THE JUVENILE COURT, Copyright 1977, Ballinger Publishing Company.
*B.S. 1963, Temple University; J.D. 1966, LL.M. 1967, University of California,
Berkeley. Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
**B.A. 1963, LL.B. 1966, Harvard University; LL.M. 1968, Northwestern University. Pro-
fessor of Law, University of New Mexico.
"'Persons in Need of Supervision," or PINS, is but one of the statutory labels used to
describe children who disobey parental commands or otherwise behave in a manner illegal only
for children. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712(b) (McKinney Supp. 1973-74). In Illinois they
are called "Minors in Need of Supervision," ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-3 (1972); in Florida
"Children in Need of Supervision," FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 39.01(11)(a)-(c) (Supp. 1974). Each
label has generated its own acronym, but PINS will be used to describe this jurisdictional
category throughout this discussion.
A substantial number of jurisdictions, including Indiana, do not recognize a separate
jurisdictional category for youths who engage in non-criminal misconduct, but include such
behavior in their definitions of juvenile delinquency. Indiana Code § 31-5-7-4.1 describes delin-
quency as follows:
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(E) Who is found in a disreputable place, visits or patronizes a place
prohibited by law, or associates with vagrant, vicious, criminal, notorious, or
immoral persons;
(F) Who engages in an occupation prohibited by law, or is in a situation
dangerous to life or limb or injurious to the health or morals of himself or
others;
(G) Who has violated a law applicable only to a child.2
As do most laws of this type,3 the statute covers conduct that is defined with
great specificity, 4 with some specificity,5 and entirely without specificity. 6 It
is, moreover, addressed to a wide range of potential complainants, among
them parents who think a child has failed to accept their control, neighbors
who find a juvenile engaging in dangerous activity, police officers who see a
child in company with criminal or notorious persons, and social workers who
conclude that a young person is in circumstances dangerous to her health or
"Delinquent child" defined.-The words "delinquent child" shall include any
person under the age of eighteen [18] years who:
(a) Commits an act which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime, except:
(1) first degree murder or a lesser included offense in a case in which the offender
was charged with first degree murder; or
(2) violations of any of the traffic laws of the state or of any traffic ordinances of a
subdivision of the state if committed by a person sixteen [16] years of age or
older;
(b) Is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient and beyond the control of
his parent, guardian, or other custodian;
(c) Is habitually truant;
(d) Being under the age of thirteen [13] years is present upon any street, highway,
park, public building or other public place between the hours of 10:01 p.m. and
5:00 a.m. unless he is accompanied or supervised by his parent or legal guardian
or other responsible companion at least eighteen [18] years of age delegated by
said parent or legal guardian to accompany him; or having attained the age of
thirteen [13] years but not the age of eighteen [18] years is wandering, standing
or loitering about any street, highway, park, public building or other public
place between the hours of 11:01 p.m. on Sunday through Thursday and 5:00
a.m. on Monday through Friday or between the hours of 1:01 a.m. and 5:00
a.m. on Saturday and Sunday, unless he is accompanied or supervised by his
parent or legal guardian or other responsible companion at least eighteen [18]
years of age delegated by said parent or legal guardian to accompany him. This
subsection does not apply to a child while in a public building or place attending
or participating in or returning home from a religious, educational, entertain-
ment, social or athletic event or lawful employment ....
IND. CODE § 31-5-7-4.1 (1976). As will appear, the points made in this article apply with equal,
if not greater, force to statutes of this type.
2Osio REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.022 (Page 1976).
3As of July, 1975, twenty-seven jurisdictions employed "omnibus clauses" making presenta-
tion of unspecified danger to oneself or others a ground for PINS jurisdiction and at least three
included living an idle or dissolute life or being in danger of doing so. See IJA-ABA JUVENILE
JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR, Appendix A
(1977).
4E.g., marriage without parental consent.
5E.g., failure to subject oneself to the reasonable control of one's parents.
6E.g., so deporting oneself as to endanger one's own or another's morals.
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morals. The statute also allows broad charges to justify action by the court
when narrower allegations cannot for some reason be proved; thus, if a child
alleged to have been a party to burglary cannot be shown to have par-
ticipated knowingly in the theft, the petition may be amended to charge her
with associating with criminals.'
It is also plain that the Ohio statute embodies not only broad and am-
biguous but potentially inconsistent standards with respect to behavior that
makes children "unruly." A child who conforms passively to her parent's ex-
pectations may nevertheless be said by police officers, social workers, or
judges to be "in morally dangerous circumstances" where, for example, the
parents are unmarried, drink heavily, or gamble in the home. The potential
for inconsistency arises from the grant of authority to various sources. Those
subject to multiple grants of such authority can only hope that each grantee
will construe similarly what is proper behavior on his or her part.
The breadth, ambiguity, and potential inconsistency of the Ohio statute
is not accidental. For reasons that will be discussed below,8 these
characteristics have traditionally been thought necessary and desirable in
juvenile court legislation. At the same time, these characteristics have of late
led to the claim that such laws violate due process because they are "void for
vagueness." The following discussion will analyze the relationship between the
legal notion of vagueness and that aspect of juvenile court jurisdiction con-
cerning respondents who are "ungovernable," "beyond the control of their
parents," or the like. Such provisions are found in most juvenile codes,
although in some states they are included within the definition of delinquency
while in others incorrigible children are classified as "Persons in Need of
Supervision" or some similar description. 9 Since this article is concerned with
the regulation of parent-child relationships rather than with the jurisdictional
category in which it appears, the following analysis is generally applicable to
both delinquency and PINS statutes dealing with ungovernable children. Its
purpose is to demonstrate that legal supervision of the parent-child relation-
ship cannot be undertaken consistently with the rule of law.
The argument will proceed as follows. The first part will review the
relatively well understood connection between statutory definiteness, legal
justice and the rule of law. This traditional approach to criminal justice will
.'Gonzales v. Mailliard, No. 50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971), judgment vacated and
remanded, 416 U.S. 918 (1974) illustrates this strategy. Eight children were taken into custody in
connection with an assault on a young girl, which would ordinarily make out a delinquency
charge. They were, however, ultimately charged with being in "danger of leading a lewd and
dissolute life" under California's equivalent of a PINS statute. Moreover, many juvenile codes
freely allow amendment of petitions, not only from one charge to another, but from one jurisdic-
tional category to another. On this practice, see W. STAPLETON & L. TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF
YOUTH 128-29 (1972); Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 CoLUM. L.
REV. 281, 308 (1967); Note, Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules: Brightening One World for
Juveniles, 54 MINN. L. REv. 303, 326 (1969).
'See text at notes 35-40 infra.
'See note 1 supra.
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then be compared with a type of order characterized by imprecise directives,
substantive justice, and status relationships, which was largely reflected in the
juvenile court's belief in the need to focus on the child rather than her acts,
and derived from a vision of the parent-child relationship as essentially one of
status. This comparison will reveal that the juvenile court undertook an in-
herently contradictory enterprise by attempting to supervise the parent-child
relationship through forms drawn from legal justice and the rule of law
while seeking at the same time to secure substantive justice. The effort to
resolve this contradiction created the problem of vagueness in PINS laws.
The second part of this essay works toward a similar point using a dif-
ferent method. The essence of the argument is that there are contradictions
within the parent-child relationship itself and within the rule of law. These
contradictions confront each other within the PINS jurisdiction and generate
an unbreakable paradox.
The paradox leads to consideration, in the final part, of whether supervi-
sion of the parent-child relationship according to the rule of law has conse-
quences fundamentally different from a similar effort at supervision by an in-
quiry directly into dangerousness. The conclusion argues that, traditional
theory to the contrary, the two models are not antinomies and that the
paradox discovered in the initial analysis arises again at this somewhat higher
level of abstraction.
STATUTORY DEFINITENESS, LEGAL
JUSTICE, AND THE RULE OF LAW
It is a commonplace of Anglo-American law that a statute may not be so
indefinite in its language "that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. '"10 Failure to satisfy this
requirement not only offends notions of wise legislative policy," but may lead
to the invalidation of both civil and criminal laws as "void for vagueness."1 2
Imprecision offends a number of principles relating both to fairness to in-
dividuals who may run afoul of the law and to the manner of political
organization. The rule of statutory definiteness is designed to assure that per-
sons will be free from coercive intervention for their behavior unless their
conduct has been previously proscribed and the fact of proscription was
knowable. More generally, requirements of definiteness are related to the no-
tion that governments operate by rules; that the rules are known or at least
knowable provides security for the fact of their existence in the first instance.
'
0Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
"See, e.g., L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-94 (1964). See also, E. FREUND, STAND-
ARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 222-23 (2d ed. 1965), for evidence that even a constitutional but
vague statute may not serve the legislative purpose.
1'See generally, Note, The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.
L. REv. 67 (1960).
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Correlatively, requirements of specificity serve to protect the autonomy of the
governed by setting forth, publicly and in advance, the areas of proscribed
activity. The proscription of specific acts and the remaining area of
autonomy together constitute the relationship of citizen to state.s
Requirements of certainty, prior existence and notice of rules are indeed
a logical corollary of the rule of law or principle of legal justice which
operates throughout Anglo-American law.14 The rule of law implies that legal
commands are uniform and general; that they cover all situations within the
class they define and apply to all persons within those situations. The condi-
tions of statutory definiteness serve these same functions, and to the extent
they are fulfilled, justice is impersonal and abstracted from the immediate
source of authority. If a law is certain, the exercise of power can be con-
sidered separate from the person or the authority exercising the power; accord-
ingly, individuals before the court may be satisfied that their conduct is
punished because of previously established rules and not on the basis of rules
fashioned on the instant for their particular disadvantage. By the same token,
their punishment is not the product of the judge's greater social or political
power but rather of rules that govern both the individual and the judge's ex-
ercise of power.
On the other hand, if a law is uncertain in its meaning, the distinction
between law-maker and law-enforcer collapses. The process of interpretation
becomes indistinguishable from the process of law-making and the exercise of
judicial authority becomes legislative in character.15 Lack of specificity in the
rules obscures the controlling force of those rules independent of the judge.
Rules which do not satisfy a minimum degree of specificity fail, therefore, to
eliminate to both the experience and the fact of personal domination because
their application appears to and may depend entirely on the subjective judg-
ment of officials.1 6
Finally a regime of rules or of legal justice can be contrasted with
substantial justice, in which specific rules for decision-making do not pre-exist
the time of decision and the rule applied at the time is wholly instrumental in
IsFuller expresses this notion:
[T]here can be no rational ground for asserting that a man can have a moral obliga-
tion to obey a legal rule that does not exist, or is kept secret from him, or that came
into existence only after he had acted, or was unintelligible .... As the sociologist
Simmel has observed, there is a kind of reciprocity between government and the citizen
with respect to the observance of rules. Government says to the citizen in effect, 'These
are the rules we expect you to follow. If you follow them, you have our assurance that
they are the rules that will be applied to your conduct.'
L. FULLER, THE MORALrrY OF LAW 59-40 (1964).
'
4See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLrIcs 89 (1975).
5See id. at 89-91.6That government by personal domination is fundamentally inconsistent with our most
cherished political values hardly requires stating. As the Supreme Court remarked long ago in
striking down a statute giving certain officials an unlimited power to grant or deny licenses,
"[T]he very idea that one may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, at the mere
will of another, seems intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of
slavery itself." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
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character. Under substantive justice, each decision is justified because it is
best calculated to advance some accepted objective, such as prevention of
future wrongdoing by a person. By contrast, in a system of legal justice the
function of law-making must antedate adjudication because the latter
operates by applying previously established rules of prescriptive quality to a
given case, whether or not reliance on those rules will under immediate cir-
cumstances best serve the general objective.' 7 The contrast between law
ordered by prescriptive rules and law ordered by instrumental rules is com-
monly understood as, at base, a contrast between the goal or value of in-
dividual freedom and the goal or value of social protection. For example, an
inquiry directly addressed to whether a person is dangerous rather than
whether she has acted in a given way may in fact better facilitate discovery of
persons who require intervention than a regime of prescriptive rules. It can
only do so, however, at the price of great intrusiveness into the lives of those
who are subject to the inquiry and of great insecurity as a result of the lack
of notice of the circumstances that will lead to official intervention. In this
respect, adherence to the rule of law is though to define the distance be-
tween state and individual in such a way as to limit sharply the government's
control over its subjects.
Requirements of definiteness also preserve the relationship of individual
to authority in non-judicial circumstances. An imprecise statute not only fails
to define the appropriate scope of governmental intervention when a case
comes to court but, regardless of the construction actually applied by courts,
compromises the exercise of autonomy by citizens who wish to avoid arrest by
the police and trial at the instance of prosecutors. The cautious person gives
the law a wide berth, realizing that the costs of approaching the margin are
very great. Moreover, the principle that laws be impersonal is severely com-
promised at the police level, since vague statutes are likely to be enforced
against those whose personal characteristics excite official disapproval.' 8
Substantive Justice and Status: The Juvenile Court Ideal
The function of the vagueness doctrine- control of official power and
provision of notice to citizens-thus appears as the antithesis of the ex-
'
7 R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 88-91 (1975). The insistence on legal justice in
criminal cases is reflected not only in the vagueness doctrine itself, but in the prohibitions against
ex post facto legislation and bills of attainder. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. In civil cases, the
vagueness doctrine also applies, and-while there is a greater scope for creation of rights or
obligations-the common law process itself tends to restrain such occurrences.
8 As the Supreme Court observed in declaring unconstitutional a Jacksonville, Florida
vagrancy ordinance:
Those generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the ordinance-poor people,
nonconformists, dissenters, idlers-may be required to comport themselves according
to the life style deemed appropriate by the Jacksonville police and the courts .... It
results in a regime in which the poor and the unpopular are permitted to stand on a
public sidewalk . . . only at the whim of any police officer.
Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972). See also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 (1940); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
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perience of personal domination. The doctrine itself comes as close as law can
come to a definition of what is not law. 19 In most contexts, both the rule of law
and its corollary requirement of statutory definiteness are accepted without
question, although their precise meaning in any given instance may be
disputed. General acceptance flows from the conviction that social
order achieved by personal domination is intolerable. This conviction has not,
however, been universally held. Domination is the organizing principle of
status relationships, in which law serves principally to confirm the existence of
the relationship and perhaps to limit the exercise of domination in matters of
detail. The archtypal status relationship was that of the early Roman father
over his children,20 and it was this relationship which Sir Henry Maine used
to identify the existence of status relationships in other areas.2' The opposi-
tion of status or personal condition to the rule of law and to the doctrine of
vagueness in particular was explicitly stated by Hayek:
In fact, as planning becomes more and more extensive, it becomes regularly
necessary to qualify legal provisions increasingly by reference to what is 'fair'
or 'reasonable'; this means that it becomes necessary to leave the decision of
the concrete case more and more to the discretion of the judge or authority
in question. One could write a history of the decline of the Rule of Law, the
disappearance of the Rechtsstaat, in terms of the progressive introduction of
these vague formulas into legislation and jurisdiction .... It means in effect
a return to the rule of status, a reversal of the 'movement of progressive
societies' which, in the famous phrase of Sir Henry Maine, 'has hitherto been
a movement from status to contract.' Indeed, the Rule of Law, more than
the rule of contract, should probably be regarded as the true opposite of the
rule of status. 22
To the extent, then, that notions of personal domination are valued, the
application of the rule of law is problematic, and it is clear that they have
not wholly disappeared. The idea of status has certainly not been rejected in
perceptions of the family, the institution which typifies the rule of status.
Courts still use that term, albeit metaphorically rather than strictly, in talking
"Cf. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 63 n.21 (1964).
"0Maine describes the Roman doctrine of potestas in the following way:
[I]n all the relations created by Private Law, the son lived under a domestic despotism
which, considering the severity it retained to the last, and the number of centuries
through which it endured, constitutes one of the strangest problems in legal history.
•.. (T]he parent, when our information commences, has over his children the -
jus vitae necisque, the power of life and death, and a fortiori of uncontrolled corporal
chastisement; he can modify their personal condition at pleasure; he can give a wife to
his son; he can give his daughter in marriage; he can divorce his children of either sex;
he can transfer them to another family by adoption; and he can sell them.
H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAw 153 (1864).
"1E.g., id. at 156-57, 163-65. Relations within the family have also been offered as the
model for the relationship between king and subject in feudal England. See Kettner, The
Development of American Citizenship in the Revolutionary Era: The Idea of Volitional
Allegiance, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HISTORY 208, 208-09 (1974).
22F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 78-79 (1944).
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about the marital relationship and it is directly reflected in juvenile court
jurisdictional provisions concerning children who behave so as to excite adult
disapproval. The general domination of adults over children is firmly rooted
in social theory and in juvenile court theory specifically.24 Equally important,
this dependent status is most significantly political rather than social or
economic;26 it is a deficiency in citizenship before it is one of wealth or
prestige. While it may be true that the dependent status of children has been
ameliorated in some degree since the turn of this century, adult domination
remains the principal characteristic of parent-child relationships. 26 Dependen-
cy places young people generally under the care and control of adults. In
most instances, the superintending power lies with parents, whose power to
regulate their children's lives as they see fit enjoys constitutional protection
and is in theory subject to state regulation only in extreme circumstances.2 7
The rule of law is by definition external to this relationship; it operates, if at
all, only as an analogy.
The principle of the dependency of children to their parents, used by
Maine to exemplify status, was adopted by proponents of the juvenile court as
the operative model for its activity.28 In their view, the court would assume
23See, e.g., Bove v. Pinciotti, 46 Pa. D. & C. 159 (1942) ("marriage is not only a contract
but a status and a kind of fealty to the State as well").
24To be classified as a child, both in law and custom, is to fall into the somewhat am-
biguous category of "non-" or "developing-" person, in which one is dependent upon adults
rather than autonomous in determining one's course of action. See Matza, Position and Behavior
Patterns of Youth, in HANDBOOK OF MODERN SOCIOLOGY 191 (R. Faris ed. 1964). Youth are, it
has been said, not only a minority group but, as for Maine, represent the minority group in the
sense that their treatment has provided "a paradigm for imputations and policy regarding disliked
ethnic factions." Id. at 194.
"Id. at 193. See generally T. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS (1950).
2"It has often been observed that techniques of parental domination have generally shifted
from physical coercion to psychological manipulation of various kinds, and it may be that the
shift coincides with the establishment of juvenile courts in the early part of this century. See id.
at 193; Bronfenbrenner, The Changing American Child, in VALUES AND IDEALS OF AMERICAN
YOUTH 71 (E. Ginzberg ed. 1961). This trend has tended to produce greater indulgence and,
consequently, greater freedom for children. However, such amelioration does not remove their
dependency nor, indeed, substantially modify it as a legal matter.
"See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised,
undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protec-
tion ....
The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essential'
'basic civil rights of man' . . . and [rlights far more precious than property
rights.
' . . It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.'
Id. at 651.
"
8 The principle of youthful dependency was used to justify traditional juvenile court theory
by the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges as recently as 1967, in an amicus curiae brief.
Some of the vociferous critics of the juvenile courts seem to forget what the wise
parent knows, for example, that children really are not adults. They do not come to
life fully equipped with knowledge and wisdom, like Minerva springing full-panoplied
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the traditional parental function of guiding and controlling the youth in the
way that a wise parent should have done.2 9 In all cases involving children,
whether predicated upon criminal conduct, misbehavior wrongful only
because of the actor's youth, or parental neglect, the court would assume
responsibility for the respondent's socialization."
Reliance on family relationships as a model for official action was
perhaps most regularly emphasized with respect to procedural matters. Since
parents were not required to use formal process to discipline their children,
juvenile courts were held similarly exempt from such requirements; since rules
of evidence and procedure were not demanded of natural parents, their'
from the brow of Jove. They are not like insects which are hatched complete with all
the instincts they need to complete their life cycle. On the contrary, human children
start life completely helpless and must come to the rights and privileges of adulthood
by slow degrees. It is not difficult to see in this failure to recognize that there is a real
difference between children and adults the explanation of much of the difficulty which
underlies our present problems of delinquency and youth crime. If a child is to be ac-
corded all the rights and privileges of adulthood, what necessity is there for the child
to mature? Adults who are themselves immature, children who have never had to grow
up, are unable to lead their own children to maturity, in a vicious circle which is
nowhere so apparent as in juvenile courts.
Brief for National Council of Juvenile Court Judges as amicus curiae, In re Gault 587
U.S. 1 (1967).
21See, e.g., Cabot, The Detention of Children as Part of Treatment, in THE CHILD, THE
CLINc, AND THE CouRT 246 (J. Addams ed. 1925): "Remember the fathers and mothers have
failed, or the child has no business [in the juvenile.court], and it is when they failed that the
-state opened this way to receive them, into the court, and said, 'This is the way in which we want
you to grow up.' " Id. at 249. Similar expressions are found throughout the "child-saving"
literature. See generally A. PLArr, THE CHILD SAVERS (1969); W. STAPLETON & L. TEITELBAUM,
IN DEFENSE OF YoUTH 5-48 (1972).
This concern was not "libertarian" in complexion. The primary justifying goal of the move-
ment was prevention of future misconduct; those espousing the juvenile court, like those who
argued for use of reformatories rather than penitentiaries, assumed that this goal could best be
accomplished by rehabilitative rather than retributive devices. Creation of special courts for
children was expected to end the "miscarriages of justice" whereby, at the end of the 19th cen-
tury, youthful offenders "were let off [in criminal prosecutions] because often justices could
neither tolerate sending children to the bride well nor bear to be themselves guilty of the harsh
folly of compelling poverty-stricken parents to pay fines." Lathrop, The Background of the
Juvenile Court in Illinois, in THE CHILD, THE CLINIC. AND THE COURT 290, 290-91 (J. Addams
ed. 1957). Moreover, reformation-implying resocialization in a broad sense-was a considerably
more taxing process than simple, if highly unpleasant, incarceration in prison. As one of the
leaders of the .reformatory movement said, "in [many penitentiaries] it is far easier for a prisoner
to adapt himself to rules and regulations, preserve correct deportment, and perform a certain
amount of labor than to submit to the discipline of institutions which make a constant draft
upon his mental, moral and physical powers." S. BARROWS, THE REFORMATORY SYsTEM IN THE
UNITED STATES 9 (1900).
so
[T]he proceedings under this law are in no sense criminal proceedings . .. [t]hey are
simply statutory proceedings by which the state, in the legitimate exercise of its police
power, or, in other words, its right to preserve its own integrity and future existence,
reaches out its arm in a kindly way and provides for the protection of its children from
parental neglect or from vicious influences and surroundings, either by keeping watch
over the child while in its natural home, or where that seems impracticable, by placing
it in an institution designed for that purpose.
State v. Scholl, 167 Wis. 504, 509, 167 N.W. 830, 832 (1918).
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judicial surrogates were also free to decide matters without regard to strict-
ures applicable in either civil or criminal cases.31 But viewing the court as a
surrogate parent also had a substantive impact. Traditional juvenile court
theory extended official concern beyond discrete misbehavior to the condition
of the whole child. Those responsible for the creation of juvenile court legisla-
tion as well as a considerable number of persons administering juvenile courts
believed that official action should reflect the necessities of the child's condi-
tion rather than a narrow legal conception of guilt or liability. This "new at-
titude toward human beings in conflict with the law" was articulated by
Judge Miriam Van Waters, among others. The juvenile court, in her view,
operated from the belief that "[i]f the offender is young the object of court
procedure is not to discover whether he has committed a specific offense; but
to determine if he is in such a condition that he has lost or has never known
the fundamental rights of childhood to parental sielter, guidance, and con-
trol."3 2 Accordingly, intervention could not depend on establishment of a
narrow jurisdictional predicate. The exercise of power would adhere less to
what is ordinarily considered the rule of law, but should reflect instead an
assessment of dangerousness independent of violation of specific, previously
announced norms.
In a real sense, the juvenile court was originally conceived as a system of
substantive justice rather than of legal justice. 33 The difference between these
two ideal types may be illustrated by supposing the case of a child who
engages in disorderly conduct. If she is charged with delinquency, the court
would do legal justice by determining whether her behavior violated some law
and whether violation of that law constitutes delinquency as that category is
defined in the juvenile code. Where delinquency is, for example, defined as
conduct that would be a crime if done by an adult, the court would ad-
judicate the child a delinquent only if (1) it is satisfactorily established that
she engaged in disorderly conduct, as that term is treated under the general
law, and (2) if disorderly conduct is a crime if committed by an adult.
If, however, under local law disorderly conduct is a violation but not a crime
a delinquency finding cannot be made.34 In contrast, judicial action engages
"
1The use of the parental model was frequently made explicit by courts reviewing juvenile
legislation. The opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, holding inter alla that a summons
was not necessary to initiate juvenile court proceedings, can stand for many others: "The natural
parent needs no process to temporarily deprive his child of its liberty by confining it in its own
home to save and to shield it from the consequences of persistence in a career of waywardness,
nor is the state, when compelled, as parens patriae, to take the place of the father for the same
purpose, required to adopt any process as a means of placing its hands upon the child to lead it
into one of its courts." Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 53, 62 A. 198, 200 (1905).
stVan Waters, The Juvenile Court from the Child's Viewpoint, in THE CHILD, THE Cumc.
AND THE COURT 217, 218 (J. Addams ed. 1925). See also, Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv.
L. REv. 104 (1909).
31For this distinction, see R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLrrics 88-91 (1975).
"
4This result is by no means hypothetical. In New York, a juvenile delinquent is a person of
appropriate age "who does any act which, if done by an adult, would constitute a crime." N.Y.
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in substantive justice when its direct focus is on the welfare of the child and
the safety of society and is unconstrained by prior rules. The respondent in
our hypothetical case would be adjudicated delinquent under such a system if
that decision would promote the welfare of the public or the child, without
resort to technical statutory requirements. It is plain that the latter mode
(substantive justice) reflects the expectations of those who urged creation of
the juvenile court.
Vagueness and the Mediation of Standards
Had the juvenile court frankly been established as its proponents wished,
it would have presented a significant reconstitution of the justice system. The
jurisdictional inquiry and scope of material proof would have been radically
broadened.3 5 As it happened, however, this conception was never fully im-
plemented. The statutes ultimately enacted were the work of lawyers who
defined the occasion for intervention conventionally, in terms of specific con-
duct rather than in terms of general dangerousness.3 6 The drafters did,
however, go some distance toward accommodating the goals of their consti-
tuents by employing expansive definitions of delinquency and neglect. Open-
ended categories such as "incorrigibility" or "growing up in idleness" were
added to virtually exhaustive lists of specifically proscribed behavior in an ef-
fort to stretch as broadly as possible the conventional conduct requirement.37
FAm. Cr. AcT § 712(a) (1975). Disorderly conduct is, like other offenses against public safety,
classified as a "violation" by the Penal Code and not as a crime (which category is limited to
felonies and misdemeanors). Accordingly, New York courts have consistently held that conduct
which, if done by an adult, would amount to a "violation" cannot be made the basis of an ad-
judication of delinquency. E.g., Carter v. Family Court, 22 A.D.2d 888, 255 N.Y.S.2d 385
(1964); In re John M., 318 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1971). Nor can a child who is charged with a single in-
stance of a "violation" be found a "Person in Need of Supervision," since the statute requires that
there be more than a single incident to support such a determination. In re David W., 28
N.Y.2d 589, 268 N.E.2d 642, 319 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1971).
"
5If the child's "need for treatment," "dangerousness," or some similar standard embodied
the jurisdictional issue all evidence concerning her circumstances or behavior at any time would
be relevant on the question of delinquency or need for supervision. Proof ordinarily admissible
only for sentencing or dispositional purposes would thus plainly be appropriate at the ad-
judicative stage. Requirements that dangerousness be proved by instances of specific conduct ac-
count for familiar limitations on evidence receivable prior to conviction; once that requirement is
removed and the "whole child" is considered, restriction of proof to matters more or less directly
related to the specifically alleged misbehavior would likewise disappear.
35E.g., Law of April 21, 1899, 1899 Ill. Laws § 1; 1909 Mo. Laws § 1, p. 423. See
Teitelbaum, Book Review, 4 FAzM. L.Q. 444, 447-48 (1970).
31The early definitions of neglect and delinquency in the Illinois juvenile court law illustrate
both open-endedness and specificity as devices for achieving broad coverage.
§ 169 DEFINITION § 2. [1] That all persons under the age of twenty-one (21) years
shall for the purpose of this act only, be considered wards of the State and their per-
sons shall be subject to the care, guardianship and control of the court as hereinafter
provided.
For the purpose of this act, the words "dependent child" and "neglected child" shall
mean any male child who while under the age of seventeen years or any female child
who while under the age of eighteen years, for any reason, is destitute, homeless or
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In practice, the combination of expansive statutory language and relaxed
rules of evidence and procedure combined to approximate a system of
substantive justice of the kind initially contemplated but not formally
enacted. Allegations that a child was "incorrigible" or "growing up in
idleness" made evidence bearing on the child's general history relevant at ad-
judication; 38 moreover, reception of such evidence was not constrained by
rules of first hand knowledge and the like.3 9 This information, in turn, would
support an adjudication of wardship which did not reflect any special concern
for the strength of proof of particular misconduct. In most juvenile courts,
Judge Mack's dictum was literally followed: "The problem for determination
by the judge is n6t, Has this boy or girl committed a specific wrong, but
What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his
interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward
career.40
The discussion thus far demonstrates that PINS jurisdiction embodies a
set of fundamental conceptual contradictions, which it seeks to resolve
abandoned; or dependent upon the public for support; or has not proper parental care
or guardianship; or habitually begs or receives alms; or is found living in any house of
ill-fame or with any vicious or disreputable person; or has a home which by reason of
neglect, cruelty or depravity, on the part of its parents, guardian or any other person
in whose care it may be, is an unfit place for such a child; and any child who while
under the age of ten (10) years is found begging, peddling or selling any articles or
singing or playing any musical instrument for gain upon the street or giving any public
entertainments or accompanies or is used in aid of any person so doing.
The words "delinquent child" shall mean any male child who while under the age of
seventeen years or any female child who while under the age of eighteen years, violates
any law of this State; or is incorrigible, or knowingly associates with thieves, vicious or
immoral persons, or without just cause and without that [the] consent of its parents,
guardian or custodian absents itself from its home or place of abode, or is growing up
in idleness or crime; or knowingly frequents a house of ill repute; or knowingly fre-
quents any policy ship or place where any gaming device is operated; or frequents any
saloon or drama show where intoxicating liquors are sold; or patronizes or visits any
public pool room or basket shop; or wanders about the streets in the night time
without being on any lawful business or lawful occupation; or habitually wanders
about any railroad yards or tracks or jumps or attempts to jump onto [any] moving
train, or enters any car or engine without lawful authority; or uses vile, obscene,
vulgar, profane or indecent language in [any] public place or about any school house;
or is guilty of indecent or lascivious conduct; any child committing any of these acts
herein mentioned shall be deemed a delinquent child and shall be cared for as such in
the manner hereinafter provided.
Law of June 4, 1907, 1907 Ill. Laws, p. 70. For another instance, see 1909 Mo. Laws, § 1, p.
423.
38it was common practice, for example, to prepare and submit a social investigation report
to the judge prior to adjudication, which would contain virtually all available information con-
cerning the child's behavior, his relations with his family, his record at school and with the
police, and his attitudes in general. See Teitelbaum, The Use of Social Reports in Juvenile Court
Adjudications, 7 J. FAM. L. 425 (1967).
"'E.g., In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955).
See also State ex rel. Christensen v. Christensen, 227 P.2d 760 (Utah 1951).40Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104, 119-20 (1909). See also, Lindsey, The
Juvenile Court of Denver, in S. BARROWS, CHILDMRNS COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 107 (1904).
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through the mediating device of general standards. On the one hand, PINS
laws attempt to apply the rule of law to a relationship of status governed
essentially by personal domination while, on the other, it reflects a desire to
do substantive justice without abandoning the formal requirements of legal
justice. Broad, imprecise legislative standards were introduced in an effort to
mediate these contradictions.
In view of the conceptual inconsistencies underlying PINS jurisdiction,
the "vagueness" of PINS statutes cannot be considered accidental. Whether
the resulting breadth and imprecision of some PINS statutes is of constitu-
tional dimension has been the subject of considerable discussion 1 and a
number of decisions. 42 If ordinary vagueness tests are applied, many of these
laws are subject to challenge. Returning to the Ohio statute quoted above, 43 a
rule prohibiting a person from behaving so "as to injure or endanger the
health or morals of himself or others" can guide neither the conduct of
citizens nor of officials.44 A law that purports to attach sanctions, not only to
immoral conduct but also to conduct that "endangers the morals" of the ac-
tor or of others, is even more unclear in its meaning. The same can be said
of the provision in the Ohio statute recognizing jurisdiction over a child who
is in a "situation dangerous to life or limb or injurious to the health or morals
of himself or another." 45 It is unclear whether anything more than wholly in-
nocent conduct by the child is required to make him "unruly," and the
"situations injurious to health or morals" may, in the eyes of
the police and possibly the courts, include presence at rock concerts, Unifica-
tion Church meetings, busing demonstrations, pool halls, street corners, or in
the limb of a tree. Thus the child, like an adult under a vagrancy statute,
may be suffered to engage in a great number of activities "only at the whim
of any police officer." 46
41See, e.g., Stiller & Elder, PINS-A Concept in Need of Supervision, 12 AM. CuM. L.
Rav. 33 (1974); Note, Juvenile Statutes and Noncriminal Delinquents: Applying the Void-for-
Vagueness Doctrine, 4 SErON HALL L. REv. 184 (1972); Note, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction Over
"Immoral". Youth in California, 24 STAN. L. REV. 568 (1972); Note, Parens Patriae and
Statutory Vagueness in the Juvenile Court, 82 YALE L.J. 745 (1973).
'"See, e.g., Gonzales v. Mailliard, No. 50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971), vacated 416 U.S.
918 (1974); State v. Mattiello, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 55, 225 A.2d 507 (1966); E.S.G. v. State, 447
S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969), cert. denied 398 U.S. 956 (1970). Cf Gesicki v. Oswald, 336
F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), affd 406 U.S. 913 (1972).
41See note 2 supra & text accompanying.
"4Jurisdictional categories such as "vagrancy" and "immorality" have regularly been held
unconstitutionally indefinite. See, e.g., Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) ("lewd,
wanton and lascivious persons," "dissolute persons"); Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948) ("in-
jurious to public morals"); Ricks v. District of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
("leading an immoral and profligate life"); Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
affd 406 U.S. 913 (1972) ("morally depraved"; "in danger of becoming morally depraved";
Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897 (D. Colo. 1969) (defining a vagrant as a person who leads
"an idle, immoral, or profligate course of life"). Cf. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966)
(holding unconstitutional a statute allowing a jury to assess a civil penalty if it found an acquit-
ted criminal defendant nevertheless guilty of "some misconduct").
'"See note 2 iupra & text accompanying.
"1See note 18 supra.
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That this circumstance is no more tolerable with respect to children fac-
ing substantial deprivation of their freedom than it is with respect to adults
has occasionally been recognized 7 but, more commonly, denied by state and
lower federal courts.48 This rejection of vagueness challenges, especially in
connection with statutes covering "immorality" or the like, has been severely
criticized by a number of authorities. 49 These critics convincingly apply usual
vagueness standards to provisions of the kind just mentioned, and their
arguments require no repetition. There are, however, some incorrigibility
statutes that could, if one looks only to ordinary vagueness standards, survive
a constitutional challenge or could, without violence to the overall legislative
design, be amended so as to satisfy usual constitutional standards. Because
this article is concerned with the function of the rule of law in connection
with state regulation of parent-child relations, it examines in the second part
the consequences associated with adopting a PINS law that in terms will prob-
ably or certainly survive an orthodox vagueness challenge even assuming, as is
likely, that the consequences of delinquency or PINS proceedings on the
ground of incorrigibility are such that ordinary vagueness standards apply
despite the "non-criminal" denomination of such proceedings.50
Three such formulations are considered for this purpose. The first defines
incorrigibility in terms of disobedience to parental commands, without fur-
47See, e.g., Gonzales v. Mailliard, No. 50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971), vacated 416 U.S.
918 (1974).
48See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550, 270 N.E.2d 389 (1971); State in re
L.N., 109 N.J. Super. 278, 263 A.2d 150, affid per curiam 57 N.J. 165, 270 A.2d 409 (1970),
cert. denied 402 U.S. 1009 (1971); E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969), cert.
denied 398 U.S. 956 (1970).
49See authorities cited in note 41 supra.
"Juvenile court proceedings have always been formally denominated civil rather than
criminal in nature. Use of such a label should not, however, either remove incorrigibility statutes
from the ambit of constitutional concern or significantly diminish the level of scrutiny to which
they will be exposed. That civil laws may offend due process because of their vagueness has long
been recognized, and recently reaffirmed. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966); Baggett
v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951); A.B. Small Co. v.
American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233 (1925). If, as has sometimes been suggested, civil statutes
are less likely than criminal laws to be struck down on this basis, that is because the sanction in-
volved is ordinarily less onerous and, concomitantly, the costs of ambiguity are lower. See Note,
The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 67, 69-70, n.16
(1960). Where, however, the civil penalty is severe, it will be measured by the same standard of
definiteness that applies to criminal provisions. As the Supreme Court said in Jordan v.
DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), with respect to a civil deportation proceeding:
Despite the fact that this is not a criminal statute, we shall nevertheless examine the
application of the vagueness doctrine to this case. We do this in view of the grave
nature of deportation. The Court has stated that deportation is a drastic measure ....
We shall, therefore, test this statute under the established criteria of the "void-for-
vagueness" doctrine.
Id. at 231. The drastic nature of intervention in delinquency cases has been recognized by the
Supreme Court and has been specifically equated with criminal conviction. See In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 49-50 (1967). The consequences of adjudication as a delinquent by reason of incorrigibili-
ty are not materially different from those of adjudication by reason of conduct that would be
criminal if done by an adult. Courts have available the same remedies for delinquent children,
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ther qualification. A provision so phrased removes ambiguity from the defini-
tion of misconduct. Children are effectively placed on notice concerning the
behavior expected of them: obedience to all parental commands. Judges,
police, and other officials are likewise informed of the occasions for legitimate
intervention; occasions when it is claimed or proved that the child has
disobeyed her parents. Thus, the criteria upon which statutes are upheld
against constitutional vagueness attacks seem to be satisfied.
The second formulation qualifies the child's duty of obedience by in-
troducing a requirement that legal intervention occur only when the com-
mand disobeyed was reasonable. Although introduction of such a condition,
which is commonly found in existing laws, 51 imports a degree of ambiguity
into the definition of wrongdoing, statutes penalizing "unreasonable" conduct
have often been sustained.52 While some statutes employing reasonableness as
the test for legality have been invalidated, 53 the impossibility of achieving true
precision in incorrigibility statutes, together with the general knowledge of
children that they are obliged to obey their parents, suggest that the degree
of indefiniteness may not be fatal.54
whatever the underlying charge. Where incorrigibility is treated as a PINS rather than as a delin-
quency offense, it remains the case that a child may be deprived of his liberty until he reaches
majority. He may, as well, be placed in an institution that houses delinquents or which, although
delinquents are not there committed, is indistinguishable in facilities and programs from institu-
tions for delinquents. See, e.g., INSTrTUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, THE ELLERY C. DECISION
42-47, 69 (1975). The civil "label-of-convenience" will no more insulate PINS provisions from re-
quirements of statutory definiteness than it insulated delinquency proceedings from procedural
due process requirements.
slSee, e.g., CALIF. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601; MAss. GEN. LAws c.119, § 21; N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 13-14-3(M).
'21n United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513 (1942), the Supreme Court upheld the conviction
of a taxpayer for violation of a provision making illegal the taking of an "unreasonable
allowance" for salaries on an income tax return. In the course of its decision, the Court remarked
that "[t]he mere fact that a penal statute is so framed as to require a jury upon occasion to
determine a question of reasonableness is not sufficient to make it too vague to afford a practical
guide to permissible conduct." Id. at 523. Perhaps even more closely in point is Edgar A. Levy
Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922), sustaining rent control legislation which treated
reasonableness as a matter of excuse by allowing a tenant to defeat his landlord's action by show-
ing that the rent charged was "unjust and unreasonable." And, of course, statutes proscribing
"negligent," "careless," or "reckless" behavior have routinely been upheld. See, e.g., People v.
Garman, 411 Ill. 279, 103 N.E.2d 636 (1952) ("reckless"); State v. Beckman, 219 Ind. 176, 37
N.E.2d 531 (1941) ("reckless"); State v. Bolsinger, 221 Minn. 154, 21 N.W.2d 480 (1946)
("reckless, grossly negligent"); State v. Wojahn, 204 Ore. 84, 282 P.2d 675 (1955) (negligent). On
the matter of excuse, see note 78 infra.
5 See, e.g., Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927); United States v. L. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
"As Fuller has remarked:
To put a high value on legislative clarity is not to condemn out of hand rules that
make legal consequences depend on standards such as "good faith" and "due care".
Sometimes the best way to achieve clarity is to take advantage of, and to incorporate
into the law, common sense standards of judgment that have grown up in the ordinary
life lived outside legislative halls.
L. FULLER, THE MORALrrY OF LAw 64 (1964).
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The third formulation, ,,also currently employed in a number of laws,55
defines incorrigibility as habitual or persistent disobedience to parental com-
mands. In some jurisdictions, this qualification has been interpreted to mean
only that more than one instance of misconduct be proved.5 6 Where this is so,
the definition is as precise as that of the unconditional rule discussed above,
and no vagueness problem arises. Even if a less precise meaning is given to
the term "habitual," it does not follow that the statute is constitutionally
vague under traditional doctrine. The nature of the duty expressed is known
to those affected by it and is generally accepted by society as important.
While the court may be required to make judgments of degree under this
rule, standard doctrine suggests that such judgments may constitutionally be
incorporated into a penal or regulatory statute. 57
THE RULE OF LAW AND PINS STATUTES:
A DIALECTIC OF FORM AND SUBSTANCE
It has been argued that the problem of vagueness arose as a consequence
of attempting to apply the rule of law to a status relationship governed essen-
tially by personal domination. Vagueness appeared in the form of those im-
precise standards which carried the burden of mediating between the
demands of legal formality and the desire for substantive justice. The remedy
for vagueness in PINS statutes lies not in narrow specification of proscribed
conduct as criminal laws attempt but in global regulation of children. Two
factors make it impossible to achieve statutory definiteness by specifying the
kinds of behavior giving rise to need for supervision. The first is that the par-
ticular forms of misbehavior are virtually infinite since the particular com-
mands that parents may give, disobedience to which justifies intervention, are
virtually infinite. The second is that the particular commands uttered by
various parents to their children may be inconsistent in content. One parent
might tell his child to come home after school to do his homework; another
may order the child to help mind the store after school: failure to do either
may found an incorrigibility complaint. Since it is youthful disobedience
rather than an act itself that causes the social concern expressed in PINS
laws, definiteness concerning the underlying conduct cannot be had.
Achieving statutory definiteness through increasing the ambit of control
in this global way could be contemplated only with respect to children and is
accepted in their case only because of their dependent status. Significantly,
"See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws c.119, § 21, N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 712(b); N.J. REV. STAT. §
2A:4-45(a).
"
6See In re D.J.B., 18 Cal. App. 3d 782, 96 Cal. Reptr. 146 (1971); In re David W., 28
N.Y.2d 589, 268 N.E.2d 642, 319 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1971). See also, Andrews & Cohn, PINS Pro-
cessing in New York: An Evaluation, in L. TEITELBAUM & A. GOUGH, BEYOND CONTROL: STATUS
OFFENDERS IN THE JUVENILE COURT 45, 58 (1977).
"United States v. Ragen, 313 U.S. 514 (1942); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
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analogous control over adults is found only in association with institutionally
recognized and general deprivations of citizenship, such as imprisonment for
crime and commitment as an insane or mentally deficient person. It is not
otherwise attempted because liberal political principles and the rule of law
demand that persons be left free except to the extent specific justification for
infringement is present and the nature of this infringement is thought suffi-
ciently clear that persons may avoid official intervention in their lives. The
following discussion will address the problem of definiteness in PINS laws by
considering in more detail the nature of the parent-child relationship and the
consequences, both inside the family and in society generally, of attempting
to supervise that relationship through forms derived from the rule of law.
Socialization to Authority and Development of Autonomy
In its ideal form the rule of law in modem society mediates between the
domination of personal authority and the experience of pure autonomy.
Because it must rely on language, this mediation is generally unstable and
problematic,58 but in the context of a legal jurisdiction supervising the rela-
tions between parents and children the difficulty is particularly severe precise-
ly because there are strong interests both in maintaining a regime of personal
parental domination and in facilitating the development of the child's sense
of and capacity for autonomy. The problem of the mediation of the rule of
law in this context may be considered from several perspectives, each of
which locates the doctrine of vagueness at the center of a legal regime con-
cerned with relations between parents and their children. The first of these
perspectives focuses on socialization to authority and development of
autonomy.
It is systematically expected that parents will acculturate and socialize
their children. 59 Indeed, the perception that parents in any given case are not
willing or able to do so is the principal occasion for juvenile court interven-
tion. On the one hand, these processes imply that children will learn and ac-
cept cultural goals in general and will conform their conduct to rules in par-
ticular. At the same time, the end point of these processes is adulthood, upon
which the person becomes a full citizen whose behavior is autonomous except
as limited by the rule of law. Proper child rearing must accordingly facilitate
the development of a capacity for choice and autonomous action within ex-
isting norms. A child who does not learn social values and rules has not been
13The problem of language is considered in more detail in the text section entitled THE
RULE OF LAW AND THE INQUIRY INTO DANGEROUSNESS.
"The second year is said to be the time when parents initiate major socialization training.
"[A]s agents of socialization, the parents direct the child's learning of what the culture defines as
desirable characteristics and behavior, at the same time encouraging him to inhibit undesirable
motives and behavior." P. MUSSEN, J. CONGER & J. KAGAN, CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND PERSONALI-
TY 259 (3d ed. 1969).
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properly raised; equally a person without capacity for autonomous behavior
remains an infant. Thus, the complex of authority, rules, and autonomy is a
fundamental aspect of parental responsibility for children.
Within the family, authority is essentially personal; for the child the ex-
perience of authority is the experience of the personal domination of parents.
As the child grows, the level or degree of parental authority is reduced, and
this reduction corresponds to growth in the child's capacity for autonomous
action and choice. Unless both parents and children agree with respect to the
appropriate ambits of control and autonomy, however, the parents will
regard the child as ungovernable (excessively or prematurely autonomous) or
the child will regard parental authority as unjustified, or both.
This synchronous process is complicated by the principle that beyond ear-
ly childhood the domination of personal authority is generally unjustified.
Coercive authority in modern society must be embodied in rules, which im-
plies that, for reasons of socialization and of development, the personal
authority of parents must gradually be replaced by the impersonal authority
of rules. A child who fails to learn that the exercise of personal domination is
unjustified and that the experience of personal domination is oppressive has
not been properly socialized. In addition, the absence of a capacity for
autonomous action constitutes infantalization. The significance of this
necessary process of introducing rules in the relations between parents and
children should not be underestimated. It undermines the personal domina-
tion of parental authority without replacing it, and facilitates the develop-
ment of autonomy without literally requiring it. The period in the child's life
when the mediation of rules is most consciously present is generally a difficult
one, and it is at just this time that PINS jurisdiction tends to be invoked. The
court under that jurisdiction intervenes in a family dispute by virtue of a rule
which specifies the limits of parental authority, the level of obedience re-
quired of the child, or both. 60 The fact of intervention by rule, however, is as
significant as the substance of the particular rule, and such intervention-
occurring at that point in the history of the family when the distribution of
emphasis within the complex of parental authority, rules and child autonomy
is most unstable-underscores the salience of rules at the expense of parental
authority. It does so, moreover, in a way that denies youthful autonomy as
well.
To demonstrate why this is so, it is useful to consider the operation of an
unconditional PINS statute. The parents complain that their child is
ungovernable in that she refuses to obey their commands. The child asserts
that her parents' commands are incoherent, unreasonable or oppressive. The
60In New York, for example, almost two-thirds of the respondents charged with being in
need of supervision are 14 years of age or older, and over forty percent are 15 years of age or
more. Andrews & Cohn, PINS Processing in New York: An Evaluation, in L. TEITELBAUM & A.
GOUGH, BEYOND CONTROL: STATUS OFFENDERS IN THE JUVENILE COURT 45, 55 (1977).
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judge informs the child of the legal requirement that she obey all parental
commands, and that if she fails to do so she will be placed under some other
form of supervision. Viewed from within the family it is supposed to regulate,
the consequence of intervention is that the obedience of the child is now a
direct consequence of the external rule of law which requires unconditional
obedience by the child. Though the substance of the legal command re-
enforces the personal domination of parental authority, the form of a rule of
law undermines that authority in favor of obedience to rules.6 1 Intervention
by rule of law moves the child in the direction of autonomy by undermining
the personal authority of parents, while it supports that authority by ordering
unconditional obedience.
If one turns from the meaning of intervention within the family to its
meaning for a social order governed by the rule of law, the consequence of
intervention is the converse of its effect within the family. The court has in-
tervened by invoking a general and fairly precise rule. No substantial claim
can be made that the application of the rule to this case is a result of uncon-
trolled judicial discretion or could not have been foreseen by the parties. To
this extent the requirements of social order are satisfied by a formally ade-
quate rule. According to traditional theory, such a statute facilitates the ex-
perience of autonomy by specifying the ambit of choice.62 In this instance,
however, the rule in substance negates the experience of autonomy by stating
that the child must obey her parents unconditionally. Thus, the experience of
personal domination is only partially eliminated by this rule. The illustration
makes clear that formal adequacy is a necessary but not a sufficient condition
of autonomy within the social order. 63
The application of an unambiguous rule requiring unconditional obe-
dience gives rise to a set of paradoxes. The substance of the rule supports
parental authority at the expense of autonomy, while the fact that it is an ex-
ternal rule undermines that authority in the service of the development of
autonomy. Simultaneously, although the unconditional rule satisfies the for-
mal requirements set forth by the vagueness doctrine, its content undermines
the child's capacity for autonomous action and thus frustrates one of the
6 10ur analysis here relates to wider concerns with the relationship of social wholes to social
parts. Max Gluckman, for example, has argued that wider kinship groupings both support the
family and are inimical to it. See M. GLUcKMAN, CUSTOM AND CONFLICT IN AFRIcA 57 (1955).
Slater has hypothesized that social interference with the family, regardless of its content, tends to
democratize the family and make it child centered. See Social Change and the Democratic Fami-
ly, in W. BENNIS & P. SLATER, THE TEMPORARY SociETY 20, 37 (1968). Walzer has noted: "It is
a commonplace of political history that despotism often plays an important part in clearing the
way for democracy. A despot destroys the structure of intermediate powers and makes possible a
politics based on individual interests." M. WALzER, THE REVOLUTION OF THE SAINTs 151 (1965).
O'$ee text accompanying note 13 supra.
6 See generally the Hart-Fuller exchange contained in Hart, Positivism and the Separation
of Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593 (1958); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law, 71 HARV. L.
REv. 630 (1958). See also the trenchant demystification of these issues in Kennedy, Legal For-
mality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973).
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principal values associated with a social order based on rules. If, as one
assumes, it is preservation of those values which warrants invocation of the
due process clause, this analysis collaterally suggests that reliance on the
traditional vagueness doctrine may be dysfunctional, at least when the law
seeks definiteness through global rather than specific description of the pro-
scribed behavior. Certainly that seems to be the case here, where the most
precisely drafted statute and the one which would be most readily sus-
tained under ordinary vagueness standards most directly compromises the
values of the rule of law.
Control and Responsibility
The paradoxes revealed by the perspective of authority and autonomy
arise from the nature of the PINS enterprise itself-reliance on the rule of
law, which presupposes a relationship of the kind that exists between citizen
and state, in a relationship which values personal domination and which
resembles status rather than citizenship. The question now is whether this set
of paradoxes may be eliminated by modifying the content of the rule within
the bounds of the vagueness doctrine or whether any formulation consistent
with the rule of law produces contradictions of the sort already observed. In-
itially, consideration will be given to the result under a rule requiring obe-
dience only to reasonable parental commands; and in the course of that in-
quiry a second perspective, one of control and responsibility, will be added to
that of socialization and development.
At first glance, a rule of obedience qualified by reasonableness seems to
reduce the paradox demonstrated by the perspective of socialization and
development. On the one hand, the substance of the rule supports only a
limited ambit of parental authority and to that extent permits the develop-
ment of autonomy, and, as was true of the unconditional formulation, the
rule is external to the parental authority it supposedly asserts, pushing in the
direction of autonomy. On the other hand, while the substance of the rule
supports the development of autonomy to a greater extent than an unquali-
fied rule, it reduces both the general level of autonomy in society and the
child's experience of freedom from personal domination by introducing a
measure of uncertainty in the reach of the rule. The result of qualifying the
requirement of obedience is not so much to remove the experience of per-
sonal domination but to substitute judicial for parental domination. A
qualified rule accordingly perpetuates the initial paradox, but in somewhat
different form. As between parent and child it intervenes on the side of
developmental autonomy, but does so by sacrificing the clarity of rules upon
which general social autonomy is said to depend.
The nature of this contradiction is clarified when attention is directed to
the allocation of control and responsibility effected by the qualified rule of
obedience. As a general proposition, control and responsibility are mutually
[Vol. 53:1
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exclusive notions. All members of society are deemed either capable of assum-
ing responsibility for their acts or they are not.6 4 In the latter event, they may
properly be subjected to the control of others. Because control is predicated
upon lack of capacity, usually for reasons of mental disease or defect, for
responsible action, those who are deemed subject to control will not be held
responsible for their acts, at least when those acts relate to the sphere of con-
trol.6 5 It is only the person who is not under control that may be held respon-
sible for her acts in this scheme.
The position of children, however, under incorrigibility laws falls into
neither category. An unconditional rule of obedience would say that all
children are under parental control with respect to the infinite range of mat-
ters parents might choose to regulate. At the same time, most older children
would be held responsible for precisely the same range of conduct; that is,
they would be adjudicated delinquent or in need of supervision for choosing
to act in a manner contrary to their parents' commands. 6 Thus, children are
simultaneously subject to control and responsible for their acts relating to the
"4See Katz, Dangerousness: A Theoretical Reconstruction of the Criminal Law: 1, 19 BUFFALO
L. REv. 1, 28-30 (1970). See also Szasz, Politics and Mental Health, 115 AM. J..PsYcH. 508, 509
(1958).
65Thus, the legal condition of an insane person will not change because he escapes and does
harm. The same may be said of the incompetent who purports to enter into a business arrange-
ment; he will not be held responsible for his act precisely because of his legal irresponsibility in
business matters. This is, moreover, the situation in matters involving children apart from the
juvenile court. Contracts entered into by minors are ordinarily voidable because of their presumed
incapacity for responsible judgment in such transactions, and the same is true with regard to
most other areas of law. See Lefstein, Stapleton & Teitelbaum, In Search of Juvenile Justice:
Gault and Its Implementation, 3 L. & Soc'y REv. 491, 553-58 (1969).
"At least where incorrigibility is included within delinquency statutes, responsibility in the
ordinary sense seems to be required before an adjudication can be made. This is true even with
respect to formal notions of responsibility derived from the criminal law; with few exceptions,
courts that have recently considered the issue hold that children may raise defenses of mental in-
capacity in connection with delinquency prosecutions. In Winburn v. State, 32 Wis. 2d 152, 145
N.W.2d 178 (1966). the court rejected an argument that the rehabilitative purposes of the
juvenile court made such defenses inappropriate:
Irrespective of what we call the juvenile procedure, and no matter how benign and
well-intended the judge who administers the system, the juvenile procedures, to some
degree at least, smack of "crime and punishment." While the primary statutory goal is
the best interest of the child, that interest is, as it should be, conditioned by the con-
sideration of "the interest of the public." . . . The interest of the public is served not
only by rehabilitating juveniles when that is possible, but the interest of the public is
also served by removing some juveniles from environments where they are likely to
harm their fellow citizens. Retribution, in practice, plays a role in the function of the
juvenile court. The judgments of juvenile courts do serve as deterrents ...
Id. at 161, 145 N.W.2d at 182. Courts in California and Florida have held that statutory and
common law defenses of infancy likewise operate in delinquency matters. In re Gladys R., 1 Cal.
3d 855, 464 P.2d 127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1970); State v. D.H., 309 So. 2d 601 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975). Cf. In re H.C., 106 N.J. Super. 583, 256 A.2d 322 (1969). Contra, Borders v.
United States, 256 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1958).
No cases involving defenses of mental capacity in respect of PINS proceedings appear to be
reported. The issue would only rarely arise because the imprecision of the definition allows courts
to decide whether the child is in need of supervision by implicitly incorporating a scienter or
wilfulness requirement-e.g., that the child has intentionally or knowingly disobeyed his parents.
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potentially infinite sphere of control. Specifically, the child's wrongdoing lies
in her failure to obey, an "omission" in standard criminal law terms, for
which she will be held responsible.6 7
While the contradiction in ideas of control and responsibility is clear in
connection with an unconditional rule, its special significance becomes ap-
parent in considering the rule of obedience to reasonable commands. Such a
rule tells the child that the ambit of parental authority and control is limited
to commands which are "reasonable;" that is, which accurately reflect the
child's own limitations. Implicitly, if not expressly, the qualified rule also tells
the child that she is autonomous with respect to unreasonable parental com-
mands -presumably those which impose limitations more stringent than her
own capacity justifies. She will, therefore, be held responsible for judging cor-
rectly whether a parental command was reasonable, which judgment must
necessarily be independent of the parent's own determination implicit in the
act of commanding obedience. In effect, the child will be held responsible for
going beyond the limits of her sphere of responsibility.
The relationship between the contradictions apparent under this perspec-
tive and those associated with socialization and autonomy is evident. The
degree of autonomy available under a reasonable command rule is a function
of the child's capacity for responsible action. While qualification of the duty
of obedience formally provides the youth some sphere of freedom, that sphere
is simultaneously limited by the nature of the decision she must make. A
determination that a given command is reasonable, taking into account the
child's age, maturity, prior experience, school history, psychological charac-
teristics, and special needs and the family's strength, mutual relationships,
values, aspirations, psychological needs, comprises all that there is to be said
about both child and family. The child cannot well rely on her capacity to
assess these variables in the same way as the judge and, therefore, cannot
safely assert freedom from parental commands. Moreover, the less able she is
to make such an evaluation, the more likely it is that she will be held proper-
ly under control and responsible for her omission to submit to that control.
Nor will intervention under such a standard clarify the parent-child relation-
ship for the future. The generality of the governing standard and the imper-
manent character of the circumstances taken into account suggest that each
decision will be a new one.
The qualified rule also complicates the situations outside the context of
the particular family. The court must intervene either on the side of the
parent who complains that the child has disobeyed a reasonable command or
on the side of the child who claims the command was unreasonable, but it
can no longer do so with perfect assurance that it is mediating authority and
67In the general criminal law, offenses characterized as omissions are problematic on two
grounds: the character of the duty or its scope is frequently obscure and the absence of an affir-
mative act makes assessment of culpability difficult. Both of these are varieties of the problem of
vagueness and hence give rise to analysis in terms of the rule of law.
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autonomy with precise rules.68 Consequently, intervention may be experienced
by the losing party as an unjustified exercise of personal domination by the
judge.
In summary, we have noted that the paradox of autonomy and authority
tends to be ameliorated when an unconditional rule is made conditional; the
modification pushes in the direction of autonomy. However, introducing the
perspective of control and responsibility indicates that a qualified rule under-
mines the mediating capacity of rules both within the particular family and
in society generally. Within the family, introducing a standard of reasonable-
ness produces a direct confrontation of authority with autonomy when it
reduces the mediating power of a clear rule by making the child responsible
for determining the reasonable limits of control over her. Outside the par-
ticular family, the introduction of a qualified rule makes judicial discrimina-
tions more obviously subjective and idiosyncratic, and thus opens up the
possibility that public authority will be experienced as personal (judicial)
domination rather than as a social order open to autonomous action and
choice within general, impersonal rules. While the qualified or conditional
rule mitigates the paradox of authority and autonomy which the conditional
rule generates by its contradiction of form and substance, it simultaneously
undermines the child's development of rule-oriented autonomy within the
family and the general social experience of freedom from unjustified authori-
ty which the rule of law otherwise assures.
Character and Choice
The third PINS formulation that appears facially consistent with the re-
quirements of statutory definiteness is a rule which subjects a child to coercive
disposition only if she habitually disobeys the (reasonable) commands of her
parents. In conjunction with this standard, a third perspective, that of
character and choice, will be added.
The perspective of character and choice is directly related to an essential
function of PINS laws-distinguishing those children who ought to be subject
"The characterization of the failure of obedience as an act of omission complicates the
situation outside the family in yet another way. The PINS jurisdiction does not exist simply to
resolve minor squabbles within the family, but to deal with behavior problems with which the
parents appear unable to cope. This implies that the judge must distinguish those cases in which
the child is in need of supervision from those cases in which she is not. The character of failure
of obedience as a type of omission "offense," in combination with obscurity in the scope of the
duty to obey reasonable commands, makes this distinction particularly difficult. Together they
open up several possibilities: the child may have honestly and sincerely believed that the com-
mand was unreasonable, and otherwise stands ready to obey all reasonable commands; or disobe-
dience may mean that the child never bothered to determine with any degree of care or
seriousness whether the command was or was not reasonable; or the child may have known full
well that the command was reasonable but chose to exploit the ambiguity of the qualified rule of
obedience to her own advantage or simply to drive her parents crazy. The absence of an affirm-
ative act and the absence of certainty in the rule combine to make judicial selection among these
alternatives especially difficult.
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to coercive disposition from those who should not. If the original juvenile
court theory had been formally adopted, this determination could have been
reached by consideration of all information bearing on the respondent's
character, without necessary reliance on concrete instances of behavior.6 9 The
inclusion of an act requirement in both delinquency and PINS statutes re-
quires, however, that dangerousness in children be predicted from behavior, 0
and evidentiary rules further require that, where jurisdiction is defined entire-
ly in terms of disobedience, only evidence related to the child's conduct or
omission be admitted.7 1 Thus, a decision that a given child needs supervision
beyond that to which she is accustomed must initially depend on proved
misbehavior. However, behavior by itself says little about the actor's character
or particularly her dangerousness. It is neutral unless the actor was aware
that her conduct was wrongful and chose nevertheless to engage in it. In this
respect, the judgment which distinguishes children on the basis of behavior
presupposes that children retain some general capacity for choice and have
exercised that capacity on one or more occasions. Operationally, behavior is
evidence that choices have been made, and the way choices are made says
something but not everything about character. Thus, the perspective of
character and choice is directly related to the judicial need to differentiate
among children.
Since behavior is the basis for inferring choice, the importance of
statutory definiteness is obvious. The area of proscribed activity must be suffi-
ciently unambiguous that one may know of its existence for any inference
about choice to be permissible. This is important for the citizen, who is en-
titled to remain free of authority unless she could have chosen to stay within
the law; it is equally important from an institutional perspective since,
without adequate precision, the central inference justifying intervention can-
not be made. The clearer the law, it is thought, the more confidence one
may have that offenders knew what their choices were and chose to violate
the law.72 Correlatively, the more confident one is that the actor so chose, the
clearer the inference about her character.
The perspective of character and choice builds upon the two previous
perspectives in the following way. It is related in an obvious way to the
perspective of control and responsibility. To the extent the child chooses
among options she may be held responsible for her choices. Holding her
"See note 55 supra. -
"
0See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
"Traditionally, juvenile court proceedings were conducted informally and without strict
regard to rules of evidence. See notes 38-39 supra & text accompanying. Most, if not all, current
laws and decisions require that adjudicative hearings be conducted according to generally
prevailing rules of evidence. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14A-14 (1976); N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT § 744(a) (1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.25(3) (West 1957) (customary civil rules of evidence
apply).
"
2 This function of the definiteness doctrine is not ordinarily mentioned in connection with
constitutional claims but is central to the theoretical basis for punishing under traditional theory.
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responsible for her choices means making an assessment of her character;
making a judgment about the degree of control she needs must necessarily
take her past choices into account. In turn, a judicial assessment of character
and need for control will determine the distribution of authority and
autonomy in the child's immediate future. Put another way, character and
choice, control and responsibility, both determine and are determined by the
socialization of authority and the development of autonomy. Socialization,
control, and character are thus related to each other in the way development,
responsibility, and choice are related to each other.73
The introduction of a requirement that the child must habitually disobey
the reasonable commands of her parents before becoming subject to legal
control may ameliorate the contradictions in notions of socialization and
development and control and responsibility discussed above. The extent to
which it does so is, however, inversely proportional to the clarity of the term
"habitual." If that term means, as it commonly does, that there need only be
more than one instance of disobedience, the resulting ambit of choice is vir-
tually valueless. In order to supply a significant range of autonomy for
children, the condition for intervention must be made not more precise but
more ambiguous by, for example, interpreting it to mean an extended course
of defiance or multiple occasion of serious wrongdoing. An habitualness
qualification, so interpreted, does not communicate a mixed message of the
sort which results from the unconditional or reasonableness rules. The uncon-
ditional rule substantively affirms parental authority while formally under-
mining it; the rule qualified by reasonableness tends to distribute its emphasis
in the direction of developmental autonomy but undercuts this autonomy,
within the family, by forcing the child to make judgments she is, by defini-
tion, poorly equipped to make. A rule qualified further to cover only
habitual disobedience of reasonable commands distributes its emphasis in the
direction of increased developmental autonomy by refusing to intervene ex-
cept in the more extraordinary cases, and it lifts some of the burden of choice
from the child by allowing her greater margin of error in making judgments
of reasonableness before external coercive intervention will be regarded as
necessary. Within the family, then, the doubly qualified rule may push in the
direction of autonomy by refusing to intervene in what the rule describes
substantively as instances of minor disobedience.
Outside the family context, however, the situation is not so hopeful. The
doubly qualified rule indicates that when a child is made subject to the PINS
jurisdiction, the appropriateness of coercive disposition is to be determined on
"The relationships would appear as follows in tabular form:
Perspective Authority Autonomy
First Socialization Development
Second Control Responsibility
Third Character Choice
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the basis of a history of choices made over time. The doubly qualified rule
does not permit any single choice to be made the basis of a judgment of
character, and prior to actual litigation there is no way to predict which
choices will be considered relevant to the assessment of character, or how
many such choices are either necessary or sufficient.
The situation might be compared with profit to the adult criminal pro-
cess. The criminal law presupposes that adults have a matured capacity for
choice so that a discrete instance of behavior may be made the basis for a
legal judgment which carries serious consequences for the adult. In a real
sense the criminal law assesses character on the basis of one particular exer-
cise of choice, 74 but it may do so only so long as its presupposition of a
mature cognitive and effective capacity for choice is firmly tied to reality.
This presupposed capacity for choice must be weaker in the case of
children. An assessment of their character cannot and should not be made on
the basis of isolated instances of behavior; one needs a history or pattern of
behavior. However, reliance on a history or pattern of behavior reduces the
relative significance of any particular exercise of choice. Where the criminal
law demands that the facts which constitute a particular event be meticulous-
ly examined because all judgments depend on those facts, under the doubly
qualified rule a rigorous factual inquiry with respect to any particular event is
considerably less important precisely because no single event has dispositive
significance.
The doubly qualified rule produces the following situation. Within the
family it pushes in the direction of autonomy and places considerably less em-
phasis on socialization; it also reduces the child's burden of responsibility by
eliminating the need for her to make an accurate assessment of reasonable-
ness in each instance. But outside the family, the doubly qualified rule
undermines the social level of autonomy within rules by fracturing the clarity
and simplicity of rule-based judgments, leaving obscure which exercises of
choice will be subsequently considered relevant in an assessment of character.
Correlatively, this formulation makes impossible any confident prediction of
the number or seriousness of acts which will occasion intervention. Since the
relative significance of any particular instance of behavior is reduced by its
inclusion in a history or pattern of behavior, an accurate, careful or complete
determination of the factual circumstances of each instance becomes un-
necessary. In short, the doubly qualified rule intensifies the experience of per-
sonal (judicial) domination, and thus weakens the social sense of autonomy
within impersonal, general rules. The measure of developmental autonomy
4See A. Katz, Studies in Boundary Theory 45-51 (unpublished 1976) for a more intensive
discussion of the Principle of Offense and the Principle of Character in the general criminal law.
The scope of inquiry justified and required by the "habitual" PINS formulation falls be-
tween the sharply confined ordinary criminal process and the completely open-ended practice in
the case of institutionalized mental patients. With regard to the latter, see E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS
155-56, 163 (1961).
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within the family which the doubly qualified rule permits is reversed outside
the family by a reduction of general social autonomy within the rule of law.
This analysis leads to the following observation. A PINS jurisdiction can
maintain the rule of law only at the cost of communicating to parents and
children an ambiguous social message regarding the proper mix of socializa-
tion and development, authority and autonomy within the family. This con-
fusion can be reduced by introducing qualified rules which tend to push in
the direction of developmental autonomy within the family, but simul-
taneously do violence to the rule of law in society. Consequently, these rules
cut against the general social experience of autonomy within rules. A more
concise formulation of this observation is that a PINS jurisdiction which
respects autonomy is incompatible with the rule of law in society; a PINS
jurisdiction based on the rule of law interferes with the socialization of
authority and the development of autonomy mediated by rules within the
family. 75
THE RULE OF LAW AND THE INQUIRY INTO DANGEROUSNESS
The foregoing analysis throws into serious doubt the traditional assump-
tion that a social order based on rules necessarily provides those governed by
it with a knowable area of autonomy, responsibility and choice. Indeed, it
has appeared that the more PINS laws conform to the rule of law through
definiteness of language, the more severely autonomy, responsibility and
choice are compromised. This conclusion leads to further doubt concerning a
fundamental tenet of criminal law theory discussed throughout this essay:
that a social order based on rules and one founded on an inquiry directly into
dangerousness, not mediated by prescriptive rules, present an antinomy. 76
Normal version theory assumes that a sharp contrast can be drawn be-
tween a society ordered by specific prescriptive rules and one in which rules
are instrumental and directly oriented to goals. 77 This is the political meaning
of the difference between legal and substantive justice. As generally under-
stood, the vagueness doctrine is a logical corollary of government by legal
justice or by the rule of law. Statutory definiteness is thought to assure the
uniformity and generality of legal rules which in turn are expected to mediate
between the experience of personal domination and that of perfect autonomy.
Rules which do not meet a minimum degree of specificity fail to eliminate
the experience of domination because their application depends on the sub-
75Our analysis of the differential impact of norms inside and outside the family, and the
variations across three degrees of statutory precision, should be compared with Gluckman's
utilitarian belief in the adaptation value of flexible and inconsistent social norms. See M.
GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA (1955).
76A recent expression of this view can be found in Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong
Reason, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 293, 301 (1975).
"See notes 10-18 supra & text accompanying.
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jective judgment of those exercising authority. The vagueness doctrine at-
tempts to identify those rules which are not law. 78
Contrast with this model a PINS law that is facially inconsistent with the
rule of law, one that focuses directly on the child's dangerousness. It has the
same general goal as the three formulations discussed in Part II: identifica-
tion of that excessive assertion of youthful autonomy which creates concern
for the child's future behavior. Unlike those formulations, however, the pro-
posed statute would abandon jurisdictional definitions referring to particular
behavior (disobedience of parental commands of whatever quality and with
whatever regularity) and authorize intervention upon a finding that the child
is dangerous in the same sense assumed by current statutes: that her disobe-
dience is manifested within a universe of circumstances which suggest that,
without intervention, she is likely to become an adult deviant.
Lawyers will quickly say that such a statute is contrary to what is meant
by law. The dangerousness inquiry gives no notice of the conduct that occa-
sions official intervention, nor does it confine the exercise of authority by
public officials. Moreover, the law provides no assurance of uniform and
equal application, because the exercise of power in any individual case does
not depend on objective behavior that can be evaluated for its similarity to
behavior in other cases. All these objections are ultimately directed toward
the single claim that the term "dangerousness," as used here, is vague.
Initially it should be apparent that the difference between the rule of law
and the dangerousness formulation in this respect must be at most one of
degree. The generality and uniformity of the rule of law deped4 heavily on
language. The meaning of a rule must be sufficiently clear to citizens that
they might exercise a margin of autonomy free of concern for the potential il-
legality of their conduct. The extent to which they may be secure in this
freedom further depends on the degree of assurance that officials will not
read the language of a rule in such a way that their conduct will be included
within it. In general, acceptance of a regime of rules implies a belief that the
language of rules exercises real control over the officials charged with their
enforcement; in no other way can the experience of personal domination be
eliminated. The rule of law is, therefore, weakened to the extent there is no
substantial unanimity on the meaning of a particular set of words. That is
the precise significance of the vagueness doctrine.
It appears, however, intuitively or as a matter of common experience,
that substantial unanimity on the meaning of a particular set of words is
"To the extent the rule of law seeks to eliminate the experience of personal domination,
and vagueness is understood as the doctrinal specification of the point at which this effort has
failed, it is doubtful that Professor Fletcher's distinction between "definitional" vagueness and
"justification" vagueness is or should be persuasive. Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Rea-
son, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 293, 308-16 (1975). Uncertainty as to whether or not an act which meets
the formal definition of an offense is justified gives rise to the experience of personal domination
no less than uncertainty in the definition of the offense. See generally R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE
AND POLITICS 80, 92-94 (1975).
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highly problematic. Moreover, the problem cannot be avoided by choosing
words that are clear and avoiding words that are not. Ambiguity or vagueness
is not a problem of language as such; some words are not inherently more
clear or more ambiguous than others. Rather, the precision of language is
relational. 79 If a given locution corresponds to a common experience or
shared value, it is clear; otherwise it is not. Accordingly, adherence to the
rule of law requires that a given locution correspond to common experience
or shared values. This judgment of correspondence is what is required by the
legal doctrine of vagueness.
Perhaps the most common method of dealing with the problem of deter-
mining the existence of shared meaning is to distinguish between the core
meaning of a legal proposition expressed in words and its potential or penum-
bral meanings. The core meaning is said to be that reading of legal language
which would produce substantial unanimity.80 The notion of core meaning
serves, however, only to expose and not to remove the central difficulty posed
by the rule of law's entire dependence on language.
The determination of correspondence between statutory language and
core meaning must be made by a judge who must initially determine what
the core meaning is and then decide whether that core meaning corresponds
to common experience or shared values. Actually, however, what seem to be
two steps is a single operation, for the judge cannot subjectively determine
the core meaning of the language; he must determine whether the given set
of words has a core meaning in common experience or shared values. Plainly
this is an empirical question of some difficulty. There is no little irony in the
observation that the most politically defensible method for resolving the ques-
tion is through popular representation in the legislature. As representatives of
the people, the legislature should be in the best position to know whether a
set of words has a core meaning. But, of course, the problem of vagueness
only arises in the context of legislative products.
If the doctrine of vagueness requires a judgment of correspondence be-
tween a set of words and common experience or shared values, and if there
appears to be no way for the judge to have ready access to the information he
needs to make this decision, on what basis are these decisions actually made?
At best, the judgment must be made on the basis of a judicial assessment of
the character of common experience or the nature of shared values, and the
general absence of the data essential to the making of such an assessment
leads one to believe that judgments of correspondence are entirely subjective.
A fundamental weakness remains, therefore, in the capacity of the rule of
law to accomplish its fundamental purpose: the accurate and precise state-
ment, beforehand, of the circumstances in which intervention is justified.
7 See C. HILL, CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 103-23 (1974).
"
0See Gifford, Communication of Legal Standards, Policy Development, and Effective Con-
duct Regulation, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 409, 426-30 (1971
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Ultimately, judgments concerning the meaning and enforceability of a statute
depend on subjective decisions by the judge concerning the nature of com-
mon experience or shared values. This is precisely what the rule of law is sup-
posed to avoid, and precisely what, as the vagueness doctrine makes clear, it
cannot successfully avoid.
It should also be observed that if a given set of words expresses a core
meaning, the expression necessarily reflects very common experience or
broadly shared values. To the extent an experience is common or a value
broadly shared, it is fair to ask why a rule expressed in clear language is
necessary at all. In this situation, it is surely not the language of the rule
which provides citizens with notice and which constrains official behavior, but
the shared understanding of the experience or value. In a real sense, there-
fore, adherence to the rule of law does not account for and is unnecessary to
compliance; there is no reason to expect less obedience to a more imprecise
rule or, perhaps, even to a non-prescriptive rule. Recall, for example, the
earlier illustration of a relatively precise legal rule: a child must obey all
parental commands."' The duty of obedience children owe to their parents is
surely within common experience and we may assume it is a shared value. To
this extent, the language has a core meaning. That meaning, however, lies
embedded in common experience and shared values; it is not elaborated by
the legal language. Would the absence of a rule change anything of conse-
quence? Plainly the common experience or shared value would not vanish. It
may, of course, be said that a rule is necessary since not all shared ex-
periences and values are legally cognizable, and therefore notice must be
given that this one is and authority to enforce it must be conferred. But
notice could be given and authority conferred by a rule which stated that the
duty of children to obey their parents will be enforced. If youthful disobe-
dience is the product of children's common understanding of their duty in
this regard, as seems likely, they will comply with such a rule independently
of technical legal specification.
Thus, because the rule of law is entirely at the mercy of the signifying
capacity of language, its capacity and indispensability to achieve its own pur-
poses is impeached. Statutory commands are neither objective guides to com-
pliance with legal rules nor necessary to accomplishment of their social mean-
ing. Furthermore, the doctrine of vagueness requires a judgment of cor-
respondence between a set of words and common experience or shared values,
and if there appears to be no way for the judge to have ready access to the
information required to make this judgment, it must be made on the basis of
a subjective assessment of the character of common experience or the nature
of shared values. This is a critical point. The attitude which allows par-
ticipants in the legal process to behave as though legal language is generally
clear (i.e., that it corresponds to common experience or shared values) and as
8'See notes 58-63 supra & text accompanying.
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if, when there is doubt on the matter, an objective judgment can be made,
stands between the application of legal terms to concrete cases and the actual
existence of common experience or shared values. In 'other words, the at-
titude which assumes an ability to distinguish between those legal locutions
which have a core meaning and those which do not mediates between the ap-
plication of legal terms in concrete cases and the unknown common ex-
perience or shared values.82
If, as it now appears, traditional vagueness doctrine claims too much for
the rule of law, our analysis of PINS laws further reveals that even relatively
definite statutes may fail to accomplish their purposes and relatively less
definite statutes may be as well suited to that end. Given the values served by
the rule of law, the following ought to be true if the distinction between it
and an inquiry into dangerousness is valid: the PINS formulations consistent
with the rule of law should (1) eliminate or ameliorate the experience of per-
sonal domination, whereas a dangerousness formulation should heighten it;
(2) provide for a significant range of autonomy by citizens, whereas a
dangerousness formulation should contract the ambit of autonomy; (3) limit
the scope of governmental intrusiveness into individual and group activities,
whereas the dangerousness approach should increase intrusiveness.
None of these propositions is true. The formulation that most closely con-
forms to the rule of law creates a duty of absolute obedience on the part of
children. This statute has a clear meaning insofar as any has, since none of
its key terms (child, parent, obey, command) fails to correspond with com-
mon experience or shared values. Moreover, these terms are relatively precise,
clearly notifying parents, children, and officials of what the law will enforce.
This very clarity, however, increases for the child both the fact and the
perception of personal domination. Within the family, it makes children sub-
ject to universal regulation of their activities by a source of authority identical
to the source of its exercise. Parents are both rule-makers and rule-enforcers,
and the rules they apply need not have general application. It would be no
defense for the respondent to argue that, while she has to carry out the gar-
bage, her siblings have no chores. Nor do qualified rules of obedience resolve
this difficulty. A duty of obedience to reasonable commands only shifts the
source of personal domination from parents to judge. While such a rule con-
tinues the presence of external rules governing parental domination, the con-
dition of its operation is sufficiently unclear that no limits on judicial deter-
9
2
To the extent this attitude which assumes an ability to distinguish legal locutions which
have a core meaning from those which do not mediates-outside the family-between the claim
for autonomy of individual persons in concrete cases and the general authority of community
consensus, it corresponds to the mediation of rules in the socialization of authority and the
development of autonomy within the family. That is, the child's gradual movement from the per-
sonal domination of parents toward the development of autonomy is mediated by rules: the per-
sonal domination of parents is progressively replaced by the impersonal authority of rules; the
development of autonomy takes place alongside a growing appreciation of the collective
significance of rules. See generally J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1965).
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mination of deviance can be perceived. Thus, the judge becomes the maker
and enforcer of rules, and the generality of the inquiry into reasonableness
militates against the notion that the rules ultimately applied are necessarily
uniform. Finally, reliance on a definition of habitual disobedience also raises
serious problems. If habitual means only "more than once," it in no way
relieves the child's experience of personal domination by parents. If, on the
other hand, this formulation is taken to imply some higher level of deviance
it goes well beyond the uncertainty of a reasonableness standard. Here
judicial action is unpredictable; both formally and practically, intervention
will turn on highly individualized rather than general criteria. Thus, the
function of the rule of law in eliminating the experience of personal domina-
tion by separating authority from its exercise is incompatible with legal
regulation of incorrigibility.
Precision of language in PINS laws also has the effect of increasing the
law's intrusiveness into individual careers rather than of limiting such intru-
sion as the rule of law contemplates. The more definite the formulation, the
more this is true. Under a standard of unconditional obedience, any instance
of defiance by the child, however trivial or atypical it may be, is sufficient to
authorize societal intervention if the parent chooses to complain. Nor is this
intervention simply that of a surrogate parent, since the court upon assuming
jurisdiction may remove the child from its home, place him on probation, in-
quire into his entire history, or take any other statutorily authorized step,
whatever the natural parents may have had in mind when they invoked that
jurisdiction.
An inquiry directly into dangerousness, by contrast, may, despite its lack
of guidance to actors and officials, provide a greater range of autonomy to
children than do incorrigibility statutes which attempt to comply with the
rule of law. The dangerousness formulation itself conveys no particular duty
to children and it can further be assumed that actual intervention under the
rule will be limited to children with a significant history of ungovernable
behavior or who engage in some particularly serious but isolated kind of
misconduct. Minors, accordingly, have a range of choice concerning conduct
within the family bounded by these limits rather than by each and every com-
mand given them. Correlatively, the judge is able to determine directly
whether one or more instances of disobedience reflects a simple disagreement
about a tolerable level of autonomy for the child and her capacity for respon-
sibility, or a more serious problem in the child's socialization.
By the same token, a dangerousness statute without apparent limits may
in fact be less intrusive than existing incorrigibility laws. The latter con-
template constant intervention; the former asserts openly that the public in-
terest requires intervention only when matters are grave. Parental discretion
to invoke the process will be reduced because no rational parent can expect
judicial review of trivial complaints. Finally, while the substance of the provi-
sion is not directly addressed to parental authority, it implicitly supports that
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authority, but does so only at the point where the weakening of authority
seems to involve serious consequences.
CONCLUSION
At least in the area discussed here, the rule of law and an inquiry into
dangerousness are not antinomies. Rather, the real distinction between the
two lies in their differential distribution of vagueness and precision. 83 The in-
quiry into dangerousness is less precise about the sort of conduct proscribed,
but considerably more precise about how bad a child must be before she
becomes an object of legal concern. The rule of law provision, on the other
hand, is more precise about the sort of conduct proscribed but gives greater
discretion to parents to invoke the legal process for trivial or improper
reasons.
More generally, detailing the operational characteristics of these two
types of PINS jurisdiction leads us to the same point as did our analysis from
the three perspectives of socialization and development, control and respon-
sibility, and character and choice: a PINS jurisdiction based on rules
generates a paradox. On the one hand, it attempts to reenforce parental
authority, but it must do so by rules; the child must obey the parent because
the rule says so. This proposition has the alternative meaning that children
are to be autonomous unless that autonomy is qualified by a rule. In at-
tempting to reenforce the personal domination of parental authority, this
type of PINS jurisdiction undermines it in favor of the authority of imper-
sonal rules. On the other hand, in generating broad parental discretion to in-
voke the legal process and in requiring a broad range of dispositional alter-
natives scaled by severity, the rule of law model undermines the salience of
rules and hence the development of autonomy. Children can never know
when parents will decide to take them to court or how seriously the judge will
regard their behavior.
A PINS jurisdiction based on dangerousness, in contrast, respects the
autonomy of children because it withholds intervention until there is a serious
problem of public order. In the meanwhile it leaves the family to work
through its problems internally. However, the inquiry into dangerousness
depends directly on the existence of common experience and shared values to
give notice to parents and children, and to control official discretion. Since
the statute does not rely on the mediation of legal assumptions regarding
language, the inquiry into dangerousness appears inconsistent with the rule of
law.
It is now clear from variety of perspectives that PINS jurisdiction based
on the rule of law interferes with the socialization to authority and the
"SThis notion is borrowed from P. DIESING, PATTERNS OF DISCOVERY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
221 (1971). For a discussion of this idea in terms of the radical separation of universals and par-
ticulars, see R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975).
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development of autonomy mediated by rules, whereas a PINS jurisdiction
which respects autonomy and a narrower vision of the public interest is incon-
sistent with the rule of law. The rule of law generates an unbreakable
paradox of authority and autonomy, while dangerousness fails to satisfy the
requirements of legal justice.
